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CIVIL RIGHTS-SLAMMING SHUT THE
COURTHOUSE DOORS: THE SUPREME COURT'S
EXPANSIVE VIEW OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
KILLS SECTION 1983 SUITS FOR EXCESSIVE
FORCE AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT -KISELA V.
HUGHES, 138 S. CT. 1148 (2018).
In recent years, numerous highly publicized police shootings have
ignited a vigorous national debate over police use of deadly force. The
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures bars the
police from using deadly force unless officers have probable cause to believe
that a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the police
or third parties.' Section 1983 of the Civil Rights of Act of 1871 allows
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https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/darren-wilson-is-cleared-of-rightsviolations-in-ferguson-shooting.html (chronicling federal civil rights investigation
into 2014 shooting of Michael Brown).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.");
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (applying Fourth Amendment to state
officials through Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); see also Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding police may not use deadly force on fleeing
suspect without probable cause suspect posed threat of serious physical harm to
police or others). In Garner, when assessing the reasonableness of a "seizure"
effectuated by the use of deadly force, the Supreme Court weighed the nature of the
intrusion into the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights against the importance of the
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citizens to sue police officers in federal court for Fourth Amendment
violations stemming from unreasonable use of deadly force.' However,
under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a police officer who unreasonably
utilizes deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment is immune from
§ 1983 suit so long as the officer's conduct did not violate the plaintiff's
"clearly established" constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer
should have known.- In Kisela. v. Hughes, the Supreme Court was tasked
with determining whether an officer who responded to a call about a woman
hacking a tree with a kitchen knife and found her standing near her roommate
wielding a large knife violated her "clearly established" Fourth Amendment

government interests involved. See Garner,471 U.S. at 7-8. The Court focused on
the gravity of the intrusion into a citizen's personal liberty that deadly force
necessarily entails. Id. at 9 ("The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force
is unmatched. . . [t]he suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not be
elaborated upon.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding...
Id. When Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 during Reconstruction, Congress was
primarily concerned with providing judicial redress against a different variety of
deadly force-the brutal tactics the Klu Klux Klan employed against newly freed
slaves. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-80 (1961) (chronicling statements
lawmakers made during debates on § 1983); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 857 (2010) (documenting racially motivated lynchings and other
atrocities committed by Klan in aftermath of Civil War). Section 1983 was enacted
for three primary purposes: to redress unconstitutional state laws, to provide a
federal forum for constitutional violations committed by state officials when there
was no remedy available under state law, and to supply a federal remedy for
constitutional violations committed by state officials when a state court remedy was
available in theory but not in actuality. See Pape, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
4 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (recognizing government
officials are immune from § 1983 liability unless official's conduct "violate[s]
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."). While there does not need to be a case "directly on point" in
order for a constitutional right to be "clearly established," existing precedent must
define the constitutional right such that qualified immunity shields all officials from
§ 1983 liability except those that are "plainly incompetent or... knowingly violate
the law." See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341(1986) (holding officers are
immune from liability for defective warrants if "reasonably competent officer[s]
would have concluded that a warrant should issue.").
5 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018).
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rights by shooting her four times.6 Over a scathing dissent penned by Justice
Sotomayor, seven justices concluded that Officer Kisela was entitled to
qualified immunity because there was no binding Ninth Circuit precedent
that clearly established shooting the plaintiff under those circumstances
violated her right to be free from excessive force.
On May 21, 2010, University of Arizona Police Department
Corporal Andrew Kisela and officer-in-training Alex Garcia received a
dispatch reporting that a woman was hacking a tree with a knife.- Upon
arriving on the street where the woman was reportedly attacking the tree,
officers were flagged down by the person who called the police to report the
incident., The caller provided officers with a description of a woman that
was "screaming and acting erratically" while hacking a tree with a knife.Moments later, a third officer arrived on the scene, and the officers "almost
immediately" noticed a woman, later identified as Shannon Chadwick
("Chadwick"), standing behind a five-foot chain link fence with a locked
gate in a nearby front yard ."
Both parties vigorously contested what exactly occurred over the
next minute or so.- Shortly after officers noticed Chadwick, the police saw
a woman who matched the description of the alleged tree hacker, later
identified as the plaintiff Amy Hughes ("the plaintiff"), exit the house with
a twelve-inch kitchen knife in hand and walk down the driveway towards
Chadwick.- There was conflicting testimony regarding the plaintiff's
6 See id at 1153 (analyzing whether reasonable officer in defendant's position
would have known shooting plaintiff violated her constitutional rights).
7 See id. (holding defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because no

precedent clearly established shooting plaintiff was illegal).
8 See Hughes v. Kisela, No. 11-366, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *2-3 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 20, 2013) (describing how officers were notified of plaintiffs bizarre
behavior). The dissent made much of the fact that the dispatch was classified as a
"check welfare" call and did not report any criminal activity. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct.
at 1157 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing plaintiff holding kitchen knife did not
justify use of deadly force).
9 See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *2-3 (chronicling seqence of
events officers encountered).
10 See id. at 3 (relaying witness's communications with officers).
1 See id. (recreating scene that confronted officers upon arrival).
12 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 7-14, Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (No. 17-467) (pointing out inconsistencies in
Defendant's version of events). But see Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, 2-7, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (No. 17-467) (rebutting plaintiffs
characterization of factual sequence leading up to shooting).
13 See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *4 (chronicling Hughes conduct
after leaving house); see also Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at
3, Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (No. 17-467) (noting plaintiff moved
towards Chadwick after exiting house).
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demeanor after exiting the house: Chadwick claimed the plaintiff was "calm
and. content," while the third officer asserted that she appeared "agitated"
and repeatedly told Chadwick to "give it to me."' Regardless, the plaintiff
moved towards Chadwick and came within five to six feet of her.- All three
officers drew their guns and ordered the plaintiff to drop the knife at least
twice.- Chadwick said something to the effect of "Take it easy," but the
plaintiff continued to ignore the both Chadwick and the officers." The chain
link fence in the front yard blocked Kisela's line of fire, so he dropped to the
ground, aimed his service weapon, and shot the plaintiff four times through
the fence, non-fatally wounding her.In 2011, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit against Corporal Kisela in
his individual and official capacity in federal district court in Arizona,
alleging that Kisela used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.- The district court judge granted Kisela's renewed motion for
14 See Hughes v. Kisela, 841 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th. Cir. 2017) (emphasizing that
Chadwick was never in fear of Hughes); Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at
*3-4 (outlining Officer Kunz's observations); see also Brief for Petitioner, Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (No. 1 7-467) ("A witness later described [Hughes]
as having been in the middle of the street 'screaming and crying very loud, holding
a long knife that was like a butcher's knife ... maybe a foot long,' and looking like
"she was about to stab herself with the knife or do something crazy.").
15 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151 (recounting plaintiff approaching Chadwick).
Kisela focused on the fact that the length of the kitchen knife paired with the
plaintiff's distance from Chadwick placed Chadwick squarely within the "'kill
zone'. . ... where she could have attacked Chadwick in less than half a second." See
Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 5, Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.
1148 (2018) (No. 17-467) (focusing on potentially deadly threat Hughes posed to
Kisela).
16 SeeKisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151 (explaining reason for shooting plaintiff). Kisela
claimed that he saw the plaintiff raise the knife as though she were going to stab
Chadwick. See Hughes v. Kisela, 841 F.3d. 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing
conflicting testimony regarding knife in plaintiffs hand). The two other responding
officers did not corroborate this claim. Id. While Kisela asserted that officers
instructed the plaintiff to drop the weapon mutliple times, Chadwick only recalled
hearing "two commands in quick succession." Id.
17 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151 (applying summary judgment standard and
concluding Chadwick's comment was directed at both officers and the plaintiff).
18 See id. (detailing shooting). After the incident, officers learned that the
plaintiff and Kisela were roommates, and that at the time of the shooting, the plaintiff
was upset over a twenty dollar debt Chadwick owed her. Id. at 1151-52. At the time
of the incident, the plaintiff was taking medication for bipolar disorder, and
Chadwick did not believe that the plaintiff understood the police officers'
commands. See Kisela, 841 F.3d at 1084. This information had little bearing on the
legality of Kisela's decision to shoot the plaintiff because a reasonable officer in his
position would not have been privy to that information when initially arriving on the
scene. Id.
19 See Hughes v. Kisela, No. 11-00366, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64230, at *2-3
(D. Ariz. May 12, 2012) (granting motion for summary judgement as to negligence
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summary judgment after concluding that his use of force was objectively
reasonable.- The judge also opined that even if shooting the plaintiff was
unreasonable, Kisela would have been entitled to qualified immunity from
suit because his actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right that a reasonable officer would have known. On appeal, a Ninth
Circuit panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment,
holding that there were legitimate factual disputes regarding both whether
Kisela's conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment, and whether he was
entitled to qualified immunity.- Over a vigorous dissent joined by seven
circuit judges, a splintered Ninth Circuit denied Kisela's petition for a
claim and denying motion as to § 1983 claim). The plaintiffs complaint asserted a
state law negligence claim and a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. at *2-3. When Kisela moved to dismiss both claims, his motion were converted
into a motion for summary judgement pursuant to Rule 56 "because the parties ha[d]
submitted affidavits and other materials outside the pleadings." Id. at * 1; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Kisela argued that he was entitled to summary judgment because
shooting the plaintiff under the circumstances was reasonable and did not run afoul
of the Fourth Amendment, and alternatively, that he was entitled to qualified
immunity. See Kisela, No. 11-366, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64230, at *7. The court
denied the defendant's motion without prejudice, noting that the facts alleged in the
complaint, if true, would not have entitled Kisela to qualified immunity because his
act of shooting the plaintiff would have violated her "clearly established" Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See id. at *9-10 ("[I]t
should have been clear to any reasonable officer that, under circumstances alleged
in the complaint, firing at [the plaintiff] was objectively unreasonable.")
20 See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *17-18 (concluding "the
evidence presented does not raise a genuine issue of material fact or support a finding
of excessive force"). Applying the objective reasonableness Fourth Amendment
standard espoused by the Supreme Court in Graham and Harris, the district court
judge concluded that "even considering Plaintiffs emotional state, it does not appear
that the force used by Defendant was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 17; see also
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) ("[I]n determining the reasonableness
of... which a seizure is affected, '[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."') (internal citations
omitted). The judge pointed out that when assessing the reasonableness of a police
seizure, courts must take into account the fact that officers often act in rapidly
devolving and unpredictable situations. See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101,
at *15-16.
21 See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *17-18 (concluding Kisela
would have been entitled to qualified immunity from suit). Despite the fact the
district court judge did not have to reach the qualified immunity issue because of his
conclusion regarding the objective reasonableness of Kisela's conduct, he noted that
Kisela would have been entitled to qualified immunity because under "the standard
of 'whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted,' it appears that Defendant's conduct was reasonable."
See Kisela, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202101, at *18.
22 See Hughes, 841 F.3d. at 1081 (determining Kisela was not entitled to
summary judgment when viewing facts in light most favorable to non-moving
plaintiff).
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rehearing en banc, and Kisela appealed to the Supreme Court.- In a sharp
rebuke of the Ninth Circuit, the Court issued aper curiam opinion summarily
reversing the Court of Appeals' decision because "even assuming a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred-a proposition that is not at all evident-on
these facts Kisela was at least entitled to qualified immunity."In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
of Act of 1871 to provide a mechanism for enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment against state and local government officials." Section 1 of the
23

See Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d. 775 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying defendant's

petition for rehearing en banc).
24

See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-54 (2018) (admonishing Ninth Circuit for

failing to adhere to binding precedent when engaging in qualified immunity
analysis). The Court noted that this was not the first time it had warned the Ninth
Circuit not define "clearly established rights" too broadly when applying the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 1152 ("This Court has 'repeatedly told
courts-and the Ninth Circuit in particular-not to define clearly established law at
a high level of generality."') (quoting San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765,

1775-76 (2015)).
25 See Pape, 365 U.S. at 175-80 (exploring history of Civil Rights Act of 1871).

Section
1983 was enacted as part of a large statute popularly known as the Ku Klux Act. Id.
The act was a federal response to Southern government officials and the Ku Klux
Klan's trenchant resistance to the implementation of Reconstruction, as well as a
rash of unpunished criminal offenses committed against former slaves in the South.
Id. at 171. President Grant implored Congress to enact measures designed to
neutralize the Klan's reign of lawless terror in the South, declaring:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States ...
rendering life and
property insecure ... The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in
some localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these
evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power
of the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing
laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall
effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in
all parts of the United States....
Id. at 172-73. When analyzing the legislative of history of § 1983 in Monroe v.
Pape, the Supreme Court identified three overarching goals of the statute: overriding
state laws that violated the constitutional rights of individuals, providing a federal
remedy where state law protections were inadequate, and providing a federal remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. Id.
at 173-74. The third justification stemmed from the fact that in many instances,
Southern states' criminal laws were not enforced against those who committed
violent offenses against freed African Americans and their supporters. Id.
Congressman Eli Perry succinctly summarized this lack of even-handed
enforcement in the 1871 debates on the Act, observing:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not;
witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they
might be accomplices. In the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and
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Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, gave citizens a direct federal cause
of action against "persons" who violate constitutional rights while acting
under the color of state law.- Despite the statute's broad language, from
1871 to 1920, there were only twenty-one § 1983 actions filed, and until the
1960s, §1983 actions continued to constitute a small fraction of the federal
docket.- As the number of constitutional rights applicable to state actors
through the Fourteenth Amendment expanded, and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 1983 liberalized, the number of § 1983 suits skyrocketed.Today there are thousands of § 1983 suits filed annually, forming ten percent

machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as
if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. Among the
most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice. Of the
uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is
credibly stated that not one has been punished.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, app. at 78 (1871).
26

See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding ....
Id. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 suits. See Haywood v.
Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009).
27 See Richard
Briffault, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and
L. REv. 1133, 1161 n.139 (1977) (noting low number of 1983
90
HAR.
Federalism,
suits filed from 1871 to 1920).
28 See Pape, 365 U.S. at 183, 187-88 (holding that § 1983 applied to unlawful
activities committed by officials vested with state authority even if their conduct
violates state law); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1977) (holding municipalities are "persons" that can incur liability under § 1983).
In 1961, the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape commenced a sharp uptick
in the number of § 1983 actions by clarifying that the statute provided an
independent federal cause of action supplemental to any available state remedies.
See Pape, 365 U.S. at 183. Additionally, the Monroe Court clarified that the "under
color of state law" language citizens to sue successfully state officials for conduct
that violated state law as long as the official was acting with the apparent authority
of the state at the time of the incident in question. Id. at 187-88. Only seventeen
years later, the Court accelerated this trend by determining that municipalities can
be subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Municipal coffers
provided an added incentive for potential plaintiffs to file § 1983 suits against
municipal employees like police officers. Id.; see also Thurman v. Rose, 575 F.
Supp. 1488, 1491 (N.D. Ind. 1983) ("Today, the swelling tide of § 1983 actions
threatens to engulf the federal courts, and has no doubt forced the federal judiciary
to rethink some of the premises underlying the arguments in support of turning §
1983 into a uniform "font" of federal tort law.").
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of the federal civil docket, and the statute serves as an important vehicle for
redressing constitutional injuries and holding government actors, like police
officers, accountable for illegal conduct.As the number of federal civil rights lawsuits increased, the Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of qualified immunity to shield government
officials from § 1983 liability. Qualified immunity seeks to strike a balance
between the public interest in deterring illegal acts committed by
government actors and compensating the victims of such conduct, with the
competing public interest in ensuring that meritless lawsuits are not allowed
to unduly burden government officials by subjecting them to costly, timeconsuming litigation.- In order to achieve these objectives, the Supreme
Court refined qualified immunity analysis in Harlow v. Fitzgerald by
refusing to conduct an inquiry into the government actor's subjective good
faith and holding that qualified immunity shields government officials
performing discretionary functions from suit as long as the official's conduct
"does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."" After Harlow, courts
29 See U.S. DIsTRICT COURTS - JuDIcIAL
BusiNEss 2017 available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business2017 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (noting there were 38,925 civil rights lawsuits filed
in federal courts in 2017); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, 92-BJ-CX-KO26,
Challenging the Conditions of Prisons and Jails; A Report on Section 1983
Litigation (1994) (detailing 25,030 § 1983 lawsuits sued against state prison systems
in 1994).
30 See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (articulating
contemporary qualified immunity standard). Although the Harlow Court articulated
the qualified immunity test that was ultimately applied in § 1983 suits, the Harlow
decision only applied qualified immunity to a Bivens claim against Nixon
administration officials for allegedly violating the plaintiffs' of First Amendment
and statutory rights. Id at 806; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391 (1971) (recognizing cause of action against federal
officials for violation of Fourth Amendment). Bivens actions are the functional
equivalent of § 1983 suits, except the suits are filed against federal government
actors for constitutional violations. Id. Qualified immunity was expressly applied to
§ 1983 suits two years after Harlow. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-94
(1984) (applying qualified immunity in § 1983 suit).
31 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814-17 (discussing competing
public policies
underlying scope of qualified immunity).
32 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (refining qualified
immunity standard). The
Harlow Court rejected the prior qualified immunity test, which required engaging in
a subjective inquiry into official's good faith, because many courts treated an
official's subjective intent as a factual question that must be resolved at trial. Id. at
816 ("[A]n official's subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of
fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.").
Allowing cases to proceed to trial solely to resolve questions regarding an official's
subjective intent largely defeated the entire purpose of qualified immunity because
even if the official was ultimately found not liable by a jury, the protracted and
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assessing whether an official was entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgement stage had to conduct a threshold inquiry to determine
whether the right that was allegedly violated was "clearly established" by
existing law: if the right was not clearly established, the case would be
dismissed, because then a reasonable official would not have had reason to
know his actions were unlawful.- The qualified immunity test requires
determining whether a reasonable official would have known his conduct
clearly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights -the doctrine is intended
to immunize "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law" from § 1983 suits.Police use of deadly force is constrained by the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment." In order to avoid summary
judgment, plaintiffs suing police officers for excessive force under § 1983
must show both that the officer's actions violated the plaintiff's Fourth
In
Amendment rights and that the right was "clearly established."must
courts
occurred,
violation
determining whether a Fourth Amendment
expensive litigation process would still distract officials from their governmental
duties, inhibit discretionary action, and deter capable people from seeking
government positions. Id. at 816-17. For qualified immunity to serve its purpose,
the affirmative defense must be capable of terminating "insubstantial claims" prior
to discovery. Id. at 816-18; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
("Because qualified immunity is 'an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.')
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
33 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 ("If the law at that time was not clearly
established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent
legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade
conduct not previously identified as unlawful.").
34 See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45 (discussing intention of doctrine). Here, the
court held that police officers applying for warrants are entitled to qualified
immunity if reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to
support warrant. Id.
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) ("While it is not always clear
3
just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure ... there can be no
question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."). Police officers are only
permitted to employ deadly force if they have probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officers or to others. Id.
at 11.
36 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009) (reversing Saucier
inquiry and allowing lower courts to decide which qualified immunity prong should
be addressed first). In Saucier, the Court mandated that district court judges must
first determine whether the plaintiff facially alleged a violation of any constitutional
right at all before analyzing whether the constitutional right was clearly established.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001). Eight years later, the Court
shifted course and overturned the Saucier mandated sequence, concluding the lower
courts should be allowed to decide which inquiry to conduct first in specific cases.
See Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37.
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assess the reasonableness of the use of force from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the street, and weigh the gravity of the intrusion into
the individual's constitutionally protected interests against the
"countervailing government interests" at stake." For an officer's conduct to
violate a "clearly established" Fourth Amendment right, the conduct must
violate a right that is specifically defined by existing precedent to the extent
that a "reasonable offi[cer] in the defendant's shoes would have understood
that he was violating" the right.- While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has evaluated police use of deadly force in a variety of contexts, the Supreme
Court has explicitly warned "the Ninth Circuit in particular not to define
clearly established [Fourth Amendment] law at a high level of generality"
because doing so can result in officers being improperly denied the
protections of qualified immunity.- Thus, determining whether an officer
may invoke the shield of qualified immunity is an inherently fact-specific
inquiry that requires comparing the facts of the case to existing precedent
and ascertaining whether the caselaw would have made an objectively
reasonable officer in the defendant's position aware that his conduct violated

37 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of police use of force when effecting arrest). Whether
an officer utilized excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment requires
that a court pay close attention to the facts of each case, by weighing factors
including the seriousness of the crime under investigation, whether the suspect poses
and imminent threat to the safety of officers or third parties, and whether the suspect
is actively resisting arrest or fleeing. Id. at 396-97("The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.").
See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-81 (2007) (concluding it was "quite
clear" police did not violate Fourth Amendment when shooting suspect fleeing in
high speed car chase that endangered lives of bystanders).
38 See Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (stressing
that officer
must violate right that is clearly and specifically defined to forfeit qualified
immunity).
39 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742(2011) ("We have repeatedly told
courts-and the Ninth Circuit in particular-not to define clearly established law at
a high level of generality.") (internal citations omitted); see also Blanford v.
Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110. 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding officers who shot
man that was wielding sword, behaving erratically, and seeking to enter residence
were entitled to qualified immunity). But see Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272,
1286 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Officer not entitled to qualified immunity because no
reasonable officer could have believed shooting unarmed suspect in face with leadfilled beanbag was reasonable."); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding FBI sniper shooting armed individual in back from a significant distance as
he walked away constituted Fourth Amendment violation).
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the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.- The rational underlying the
"clearly defined" requirement is that individual officers and police
departments should not be subjected to costly litigation and liability for
conduct without fair notice that the conduct is illegal."
In Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court declined to explore whether
Corporal Kisela shooting the plaintiff constituted excessive force in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and immediately commenced qualified immunity
analysis.- The Court stressed that Kisela could only lose the protections of
qualified immunity if existing precedent specifically defined the plaintiffs
right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force to the extent that a
40 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal citations
omitted) (articulating how specifically precedent must define right for it to be
deemed "clearly established"). In Anderson, Justice Scalia noted:

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to
say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. But see id at 648 (Stevens J., dissenting) (arguing Court improperly endorsed "a
double standard of reasonableness . .. the constitutional standard already embodied
in the Fourth Amendment and an even more generous standard that protects any
officer who reasonably could have believed that his conduct was constitutionally
reasonable."). Officers are not required to use the least intrusive or violent level of
force as long as the force deployed is reasonable under the circumstances. See Scott
v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Requiring officers to find and choose
the least intrusive alternative would require them to exercise superhuman
judgment ... [i]n the heat of battle with lives potentially in the balance, an officer
would not be able to rely on training and common sense to decide what would best
accomplish his mission.").
41 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733-34 (2002) (recognizing importance of
providing fair notice of illegality to police officers before imposing § 1983 liability);
Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 ("[I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
this issue, immunity should be recognized."); Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036,
1052 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that "fair and clear notice to government
officials is the cornerstone of qualified immunity"); Soto v. Bzdel, 214 F. Supp. 2d
69, 73 (D. Mass. 2002) (reiterating government officials are immune from suit unless
they have fair notice certain conduct is illegal).
42 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 ("Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide
whether Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against
Hughes."). Prior to Pearson, the Saucier inquiry would have forced the Court to
detennine whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred before addressing
whether the right was clearly established. See Pearson,555 U.S. at 231 (overturning
Saucier and allowing lower courts to choose prong of analysis to perform first);
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01 (directing lower courts to determine whether facts
alleged amounted to constitutional violation before determining whether right was
clearly established); see also DONALD L. DOERNBERG & EvAN TSEN LEE, FEDERAL
COURTs: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 636-637 (5th Ed. 2013) (observing Saucier

sequence led courts to rule on constitutional questions that could have been avoided).
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reasonable officer in Kisela's position would have understood that shooting
the plaintiff violated the right.- The Court seemed to tilt disputed facts
regarding the situation Corporal Kisela faced when arriving on scene in favor
of the police, emphasizing the plaintiff's erratic behavior, failure to comply
with officers' commands, and the seriousness of the threat she posed to
Chadwick.- Moreover, the Court viewed the excessive force cases the Ninth
Circuit relied on to support its conclusion that Kisela was not entitled to
qualified immunity as supporting the opposite conclusion, that a reasonable
officer in Kisela's position would not have known that shooting the plaintiff
was unreasonable and excessive." Finally, the Court criticized the Ninth
Circuit for relying on Glenn v. Washington County," because the case was
decided a year after Corporal Kisela shot the plaintiff and thus could not have
given Kisela notice that using deadly force in the circumstances he was
confronted with was illegal., Thus, because existing precedent did not
establish that shooting the plaintiff in an attempt to protect Chadwick
constituted excessive force, the Court concluded that Corporal Kisela was
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 suit and overturned the Ninth
Circuit's reversal of summary judgment.Justices Sotomayor and Ginsberg viewed the record in a starkly
different light than the seven justice per curiam majority.- The dissenting

43 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (emphasizing Fourth Amendment right to be
free from excessive force must be specifically defined by existing caselaw).
4
See id. at 1153 ("This is far from an obvious case in which any competent
officer would have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate
the Fourth Amendment."). But see Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 439 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting at summary judgment, courts must draw all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of non-moving party).
45 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153-54 (explainging why cases cited by Court of
Appeals support finding that Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity).
46 673 F.3d 864, 874-80 (reversing summary judgement
for officers where
officers shot intoxicated teenager armed with pocket knife with "beanbag" rounds
fired from shotgun).
47 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154 (noting that Glen could not "have given fair
notice to [Kisela] because a reasonable 'officer is not required to foresee judicial
decisions that do not yet exist in instances where the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment are far from obvious.").
48 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (holding that Kisela was entitled to qualified
immunity).
49 See id. at 138 S. Ct. at 1154-56 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor
contended:

The record, properly construed at this stage, shows that at the time of the
shooting: Hughes stood stationary about six feet away from Chadwick,
appeared "composed and content," . . . held a kitchen knife down at her
side with the blade facing away from Chadwick. Hughes was nowhere near
the officers, had committed no illegal act, was suspected of no crime, and
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justices took particular issue with what they perceived as the Court's failure
to properly view disputed facts in a "light most favorable" to the Plaintiff,
the non-moving party, as is generally required at the summary judgement
phase.- Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Justice
Sotomayor contended that shooting the plaintiff was unreasonable because
officers were not investigating a crime, did not witness the plaintiff commit
any crimes, she "never acted in a threatening manner," and she seemed to
not to notice the officers' presence.- The dissent also pointed out that Kisela
could have attempted to employ less lethal measures to subdue the plaintiff
and protect Chadwick before resorting to deadly force." Shifting focus to
whether Kisela violated the plaintiffs "clearly established" Fourth
Amendment rights, the dissent accused the Court of applying a higher
standard that was tantamount to improperly requiring that the exact conduct
at issue have been previously deemed illegal." When addressing Ninth
Circuit cases regarding police use of deadly force, the dissent relied heavily
did not raise the knife in the direction of Chadwick or anyone else. Faced
with these facts, the two other responding officers held their fire, and one
testified that he "wanted to continue trying verbal command[s] and see if
that would work.". . . But not Kisela. He thought it necessary to use deadly
force, and so, without giving a warning that he would open fire, he shot
Hughes four times, leaving her seriously injured . . If this account of
Kisela's conduct sounds unreasonable, that is because it was.
See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1155 (internal citations omitted).
50 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154-56 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (contending facts
sufficient to provide reasonable jury with basis for finding Kisela "needlessly
resort[ed] to lethal force"). See also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014)
(holding at summary judgement "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor") (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986)).
s1 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1158 (characterizing disputed facts in light most
favorable to Hughes).
52 See id. at 11157 (highlighting expert testimony that asserted Kisela could have
used Taser). See Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cty. of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185,1204
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that when suspect does not pose threat of immediate danger
to others police must "consider 'what other [less intrusive] tactics if any were
available' to effect their arrest") (quoting Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th
Cir. 1994)). But see Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
officers do not have to choose least intrusive means available when attempting to
subue dangerous suspects).
53 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 11158 (noting that precedent must only provide
officers with "fair notice" that conduct was unlawful); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (declaring that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances"). In Hope v. Pelzer,
the Court determined that reasonable corrections officers should have known that
punishing a prisoner by shackling him to a "hitching post" in the blazing Alabama
sun for hours violated the Eighth Amendment despite the fact that there was not a
previous case directly on point. Id. at 743-47.
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on Deorle v. Rutherford- in support of its conclusion that a reasonable officer
in Kisela's position would have known that shooting the plaintiff was
unreasonable because she had not committed a serious crime, was not
warned that she would be shot if she did not comply, was not a flight risk,
and "presented no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of officers or
others."" After citing several decisions that purportedly established that the
"Fourth Amendment clearly forbids the use of deadly force against a person
who is merely holding a knife and not threatening anybody with it," Justice
Sotomayor criticized the Court's reliance on Blanford v. Sacramento
County," and sought to distinguish the Blanford plaintiff and the Civil War
era cavalry sabre he wielded from the plaintiff and her knife.- Finally, the
dissent pointedly accused the majority of exacerbating a "disturbing trend"
in which the Court has almost exclusively used the drastic measure of
summary reversal to grant officers qualified immunity, "transforming the
doctrine into an absolute shield" from liability for police officers and
eviscerating constitutional protections."
Rather than needlessly deciding a constitutional issue and
determining whether Kisela shooting the plaintiff violated the Fourth
54 272 F.3d. 1272, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding shooting
unarmed man in face
with lead-filled "bean bag" shot was objectively unreasonable and violated Fourth
Amendment). In Deorle, at least twelve police officers responded to the house of a
distraught man was behaving erratically and screaming at officers. Id. at 1276.
Although the man brandished several items that could have been used as weapons
including a hatchet, unloaded crossbow, and wooden board, he dropped all the items
when commanded to do so by officers. Id. With no warning, the defendant officer
shot the man in the face with a lead filled beanbag shoot from a twelve gauge shotgun
because the man was advancing towards the officer at a "steady gait." Id. at 1277.
The force of the beanbag shot fractured the man's skull, put out his left eye, and left
lead shot embedded in his skull. Id. at 1278.
5
See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1158 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (contending Deorle
gave Kisela fair warning shooting Hughes was unlawful). Glossing over the fact
that the plaintiff was "armed with a large knife" and appeared ready to use it as a
weapon when she was shot, Justice Sotomayor noted that kitchen knives can be used
for "safe, benign purposes." Id. at 1159.
56 406 F.3d. 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).
57 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1161 (arguing man armed with sword in Blanford
posed more senous threat of harm than plaintiff).
58 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1160-62
(Sotomayor J., dissenting). Justice
Sotomayor declared:

The majority today exacerbates that troubling asymmetry. Its decision is
not just wrong on the law; it also sends an alarming signal to law
enforcement officers and the public. It tells officers that they can shoot first
and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct
will go unpunished.
See id. at 1162.
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Amendment, the Court focused its inquiry on the other prong of qualified
immunity analysis- whether Kisela violated a clearly established Fourth
Amendment right of which a reasonable officer would have known.- In light
of the PearsonCourt's rejection of the rigid two-pronged Saucier sequence,
the Court conformed to precedent and the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance by determining whether it was clearly established that shooting
the plaintiff under the circumstances constituted excessive force before
deciding whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated.- The
crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissenting justices
hinged on the question of whether existing precedent clearly established that
Kisela shooting the plaintiff constituted excessive force.* The dissenting
justices contention that Deorle clearly established shooting Hughes violated
the Fourth Amendment was misguided because of the fundamental factual
difference between the two cases: the plaintiff was standing six feet away
from a defenseless woman while carrying a "large kitchen knife" she had
reportedly just been hacking a tree with, whereas in Deorle, an officer shot
an unarmed and erratically behaving man in the face with a lead filled bean
bag shot as he approached the officer.- The difference between the gravity
5 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 ("Here the Court need not, and does not, decide
whether Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment.").
60 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009) (rejecting Saucier
inquiry and allowing lower courts to decide which qualified immunity prong should
be addressed first); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."). But see
Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1157-58 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (analyzing whether Kisela's
conduct violated Fourth Amendment and noting majority "sidestep[ed] the
[constitutional] inquiry altogether").
61 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 ("[S]pecificity is especially important in the
Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes
difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.") (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).
62 See Kisela 138 S. Ct. at 1158-59 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (arguing "[t]he
majority struggles to distinguish Deorle, to no avail"). Justice Sotomayor's focus on
the fact that a twelve-inch kitchen knife may be used for innocuous purposes ignores
the fact that a civilian witness informed police that the plaintiff was hacking a tree
with the knife, screaming, and acting erratically. Id; see alsoKisela, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 202101, at *2-3. This reported behavior paired with the plaintiffs failure to
comply with officers' orders, or even acknowledge their presence, was sufficient to
make a reasonable officer believe that the plaintiff posed an imminent threat of
serious injury or death to Chadwick. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor was incorrect in
for asserting that the Court improperly inferred that Hughes was "within striking
distance" of Chadwick: standing six feet from a person while wielding a foot-long
knife makes it possible for the knife wielder to take a single step and stab the person,
unquestionably placing the other individual within "striking distance." See Kisela,
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of the potential threat the knife-wielding plaintiff posed to Chadwick and the
unarmed Deorle plaintiff posed to the officer is so readily apparent that a
reasonable officer in Kisela's position could not have understood Deorle as
proscribing using deadly force to protect Chadwick from the plaintiff's
knife.- The dissent's expansive reading of Deorle contravened prior
warnings from the Supreme Court to the Ninth Circuit regarding construing
the Deorle decision too broadly when determining whether law is clearly
established and would have subjected officers to liability for conduct that
they would not necessarily have known was illegal.- The Court also
recognized significant differences between the facts in the instant case and
several other cases cited as support for denying Kisela qualified immunity,
and criticized the Ninth Circuit for its dubious reliance on a case decided
after the incident as support of the proposition that Kisela had fair notice that
shooting the plaintiff was illegal.- As acknowledged by the Court, Blanford
138 S. Ct. at 1160. While Hughes had not committed a serious crime, a factor that
weighs against deploying lethal force, this factor was subsumed by the fact that
officers had reason to believe the plaintiff posed an imminent threat to Chadwick
and was seconds away from assaulting her with a deadly weapon. See Kisela, 138
S. Ct. at 1158-59.
63 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154 (pointing out obvious factual differences

between Deorle and instant case. CompareKisela 138 S. Ct. at 1158-59 (Sotomayor
J., dissenting) (arguing Deorle placed illegality of Kisela's conduct "beyond
debate").
6
See San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76 (2015) (instructing
Ninth Circuit to define clearly established excessive force law specifically).
65 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154-55 ("Glenn 'could not
have given fair notice to

[Kisela]' because a reasonable officer is not required to foresee judicial decisions
that do not yet exist in instances where the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
are far from obvious.") (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,200, n.4 (2004));
see also Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 794-95, n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (Ikuta J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing majority's reliance on Glen
because it was decided over a year after Kisela shot plaintiff). By relying on Harris
v. Roderick, the dissenting justices and Ninth Circuit flouted Fourth Amendment
deadly force jurisprudence by defining clearly established law extremely broadly.

SeeKisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1160 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (arguing Harrisestablished
officers cannot use deadly force when person with weapons poses no "objective and
immediate threat to officers or third parties"). In Harris, the Ninth Circuit denied
qualified immunity to an FBI sniper that shot an armed man in the back at the Ruby
Ridge standoff pursuant to modified rules of engagement that purportedly authorized
agents to kill "any armed adult male observed in the vicinity of the Weaver cabin."
See 126 F.3d 1189, 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). Shooting a person armed with a gun
in the back from a long distance when the person is not an immediate threat to
anybody is markedly different from shooting an erratically behaving woman armed
with a knife as she advanced towards another person and repeatedly ignored officers'
commands to drop the knife. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154 ("Suffice it to say, a
reasonable police officer could miss the connection between the situation
confronting the sniper at Ruby Ridge and the situation confronting Kisela in Hughes'
front yard.").
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v. Sacramento County was the most factually similar Ninth Circuit excessive
force case because the Blanford plaintiff was also armed with a knife-like
weapon, ignored officers commands to drop the weapon, and officers
reasonably believed, albeit mistakenly, that the Blanford plaintiff posed as
an imminent threat to a third party.Determining whether precedent clearly established that Kisela's use
of deadly force was illegal decided whether he was entitled to qualified
immunity and a quick summary judgement, or subject to protracted litigation
in which his conduct would ultimately be evaluated by a jury.- Justice
Sotomayor's dissent raises the concern that the Court's qualified immunity
analysis in excessive force cases imposes too heavy of a burden on § 1983
plaintiffs by requiring that there have been a "factually identical case to
satisfy the 'clearly established' standard."- However, while the Court has
unquestionably stressed the need for specifically defining excessive force
jurisprudence in order for the right to qualify as "clearly established," this
requirement of specificity is integral to ensuring qualified immunity
functions to ensure that officers are only subjected to § 1983 suits if they
have fair notice that the conduct in question is illegal.- Subjecting police
officers to § 1983 liability for using deadly force they reasonably believed
was lawful in an attempt to protect themselves or other others from imminent
and serious physical harm would effectually punish officers for conduct they
66 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153-54 (observing similarities between situations
officers confronted in Blanford and Kisela). Indeed, the instant case arguably
presented officers with a more compelling reason for utilizing deadly force than in
Blanford, because in that case, officers did not know whether the house the plaintiff
attempted to enter while wielding a Civil War era sabre was occupied. See Blanford
v. Sacramento County., 406 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005). By contrast, in the
instant case, Corporal Kisela knew the plaintiff was within a few feet of her potential
victim and reasonably believed she posed a threat to Chadwick. See Kisela, 138 S.
Ct. at 1153.
67 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (acknowledging qualified immunity protects
officers whose conduct does not violate "clearly established" constitutional rights
reasonable officers would have known).
68 See id. at 1161 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (arguing Court has erected more
stringent standard for the "clearly established" qualified immunity prong by
requiring precedent where nearly identical conduct was unlawful).
69 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 ("Where constitutional guidelines seem
inapplicable or too remote, it does not suffice for a court simply to state that an
officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and
then remit the case for a trial on the question of reasonableness."); see also Malley,
475 U.S. at 341 (emphasizing requirement of fair notice conduct is unlawful and
declaring qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law"); Davis, 468 U.S. at 183 ("[O]fficials can act without
fear of harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct
may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly
terminated.").
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had no reason to believe was illegal, and potentially dissuade the police from
quickly and decisively using deadly force in situations when just a seconds
hesitation can prove fatal." Moreover, while Justice Sotomayor's preference
for allowing a jury to assess the reasonableness of police use of deadly force
is in sync with caselaw that cautions against prematurely encroaching on the
province of the jury, Sotomayor's broad conception of "clearly established
law" would severely undercut qualified immunity because in order for the
doctrine to serve its purpose, qualified immunity must be capable of
terminating unjustified suits in their infancy.In defining the contours of qualified immunity as applied to deadly
force suits brought under § 1983, the Court necessarily has to strike a
balance between compensating grievously injured victims of police violence
and deterring unlawful police conduct, with protecting officers from costly
litigation and ensuring that officers will not hesitate to quickly and forcefully
react in situations where individuals pose immediate risks of serious harm to
the police or others.- While some have criticized the Court's recent qualified
immunity jurisprudence as providing the police with nearly blanket

70 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (reiterating
officers must have notice use of
force was illegal); see also Dan Boylan, Number ofpolice officers killed in line of
duty
up
sharply,
WASHINGTON
TIMES
(Dec.
27,
2018)
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/dec/27/144-police-officers-died-inline-of-duty-this-year/ (documenting nearly twelve percent increase in law
enforcement officers killed on duty in 2018); Aamer Madhani, Ferguson effect: 72%
of U.S. cops reluctant to make stops, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2017) available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/01/1 1/ferguson-effect-study-72-uscops-reluctant-make-stops/96446504/ ("More than three-quarters of U.S. law
enforcement officers say they are reluctant to use force when necessary.").
71 See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) ("Rather than
letting
this case go to a jury, the Court decides to intervene prematurely, purporting to
correct an error that is not at all clear."); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986) (cautioning district
courts against improperly granting summary judgment and "denigrat[ing] the role of
the jury"). If qualified immunity cannot end insubstantial suits quickly, then officers,
are subjected to costly and time-consuming litigation, and the benefits of the doctrine
are lost. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) ("[Qualified
immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like
an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial."); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (requiring that district courts make threshold
determination of currently applicable law and whether it was clearly established
before allowing discovery).
72 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14 (recognizing "an action for damages may

offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees"); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974), abrogated by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (emphasizing "public interest" in rapid and decisive official
action).
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immunity for shooting civilians, the Court has protected officers from
incurring civil liability for conduct that is not obviously illegal and reduced
the possibility that officers will fail to quickly employ force when presented
with potentially lethal situations. It is a tragedy any time officers shoot and
kill or injure a person that they reasonably, but mistakenly, believe poses an
imminent threat of deadly harm." However, by the same token, when officers
have probable cause to believe a suspect poses a imminent threat of serious
physical danger to others, just a moment of hesitation can prove equally as
tragic." In Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court signaled that officers who
use deadly force in reasonable conformity with existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence do not have to fear costly § 1983 suits and continued a trend
whereby § 1983 excessive force suits are increasingly disposed of at
summary judgement when the officer's conduct does not violate clearly and
specifically established law." This trend will likely continue unabated
because recently confirmed Justice Brett Kavanaugh's view on qualified
73 See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness,43 IND. L. REv. 117, 124(2009)
("Qualified immunity has moved closer to a system of absolute immunity for most
defendants, resulting in a finding of liability for only the most extreme and most
shocking misuses of police power."); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified
Immunity*, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230-33 (2006). The Court's recent increasing
willingness to dispose of cases at summary judgment appears aimed at providing
officers with something closer to absolute immunity. Id
74 See, eg., Pollard v. City of Columbus, 780 F.3d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding officers entitled to qualified immunity for killing man they mistakenly
believed was armed); Blanford, 406 F.3d 1110, 1114 (shooting sword-wielding
man as he entered house officers did not know belonged to his parents and
paralyzing him); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1991)(Powell,
J., sitting by designation)(concluding officer was entitled to qualified immunity
when he mistakenly believed that beer bottle in suspect's hand was gun).

See, e.g., Nicole Darrah, Milwaukee cop killed serving warrantID'd, leaves
behind wife, child Fox NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019)
7

https://www.foxnews.com/us/milwaukee-police-officer-shot-killed-while-servingwarrant-medical-examiner-says (reporting shooting of Milwaukee police officer);
Two rookie police officers shot andkilled in two days, ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 11,

2019), https://abc7news.com/two-rookie-police-officers-shot-and-killed-in-twodays/5056778/ (describing murders of female officers in Louisiana and California);
Bill Chappell, More Police Officers DiedFrom Gunfire Than Traffic Incidents In
2018, Report Says, NPR (Dec. 27, 2018)

https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680410169/more-police-officers-died-fromgunfire-than-traffic-incidents-in-2018-report-say (noting fifty-two officers were
shot and killed in 2018);
Laurel J. Sweet, Police officer slain, woman killed in Weymouth, BOSTON

HERALD

(July 15, 2018) https://www.bostonherald.com/2018/07/15/police-officer-slainwoman-killed-in-weymouth/ (chronicling murder of officer and elderly woman in
Boston suburb).
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See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153.
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immunity appears to align with the Supreme Court's recent qualified
immunity cases.-

Kevin Hennessey

" See City of Escondido v. Emmons, 202 L.Ed.2d 455, 460 (U.S. 2019) (per
curiam) (remanding because Court of Appeals defined "clearly established right"
too generally); Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 893 F.3d 802, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (concluding
officer was entitled to qualified immunity for forcible arrest); Flythe v. District of
Columbia, 791 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The court reversed summary
judgment for officer because "[it] believe[d] that a reasonable jury could conclude
that [the decedent] never threatened Officer Eagan with a knife" and the shooting
was thus unreasonable. Id.; Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097, 1102
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing due to inconsistent verdicts with respect to excessive
force claim).

